Showing 1 - 10 of 13
the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies …, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition …. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476048
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457305
and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe … suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471353
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a … minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471382
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules … related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473181