Showing 1 - 10 of 20
work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors, executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463112
penalty affect their monitoring. Our results suggest that they are more likely to vote against management after observing how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458
-country differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated … discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross …-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468470
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
A manager's shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458636
This paper examines optimal capital structure choice using a dynamic capital structure model that is calibrated to reflect actual firm characteristics. The model uses contingent-claim methods to value interest tax shields, allows for reorganization in bankruptcy, and maintains a long-run target...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469379
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278
shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders' welfare. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried argue …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465861