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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

The New Corporate Governance

Hart, Oliver D.; Zingales, Luigi - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

. In some cases shareholders are pushing companies to take actions that may reduce market value. It is hard to understand …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191070

Private Benefits of Control : An International Comparison

Dyck, Alexander - 2002

important in curbing these private benefits. A high degree of statutory protection of minority shareholders and high degree of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470004

What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders

Rajan, Raghuram Govind; Ramella, Pietro; Zingales, Luigi - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

find goal announcements are associated with management's responses to the firm's (possibly changed) circumstances, with the … changing power and preferences of key constituencies, as well as from management's attempts to deflect scrutiny. While … announced opportunistically to deflect attention and alleviate pressure on management …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247976

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier - 2006

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300

Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information

Novaes, Walter - 2003

argues that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468935

Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control : Entrenchment versus Efficiency

Novaes, Walter - 1995

same agency problem. We show that, in general, the shareholders' and the manager's capital structure choices differ not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473483