Economists often regard broad-based carbon pricing (whether in the form of a carbon tax or cap and trade) as the most efficient policy to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Relative to a narrower policy that exempts some emissions sources, a broader policy is often favored because it can exploit...

In a market subject to environmental regulation, a firm's strategic behavior affects the production and emissions decisions of all firms. If firms are regulated by a Pigouvian tax, changing emissions will not affect the marginal cost of polluting. However, under a tradable permits system, the...

This paper reviews the literature on the incidence of consumption and labor taxes and focuses on the empirical results that show stark departures from the canonical model of tax incidence, which I refer to as anomalies. In particular, there is mounting evidence questioning three fundamental...

There is a consensus among economists that a carbon tax is the best approach for addressing the effects of CO2 emissions on the global climate. However, past international agreements on climate change instead specify caps on emissions (a quantity target) for each country. This paper explores...

This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of pollution...

In recent years, cases in which state governments chose to override federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own have become increasingly common, even for pollutants that have substantial spillovers across states. This paper argues that this change arose at least in...

A politically realistic approach to environmental policy seems to require avoiding significant profit-losses in major pollution-related industries. The government can avoid such losses by freely allocating some emissions permits or by exempting some inframarginal emissions from a pollution tax....

It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating many different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally-binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self-interest by incentivizing...

This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic "World Climate Assembly" that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered. One is to vote on a universal price (or tax) that is internationally harmonized, but the...

Much of the air pollution currently regulated under U.S. emissions trading programs is non-uniformly mixed, meaning that health and environmental damages depend on the location and dispersion characteristics of the sources. Existing policy regimes ignore this fact. Emissions are penalized at a...