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Beaudry, Paul - 2007

Does attracting or losing jobs in high paying sectors have important spill-over effects on wages in other sectors? The … relationship between changes in industry-specific city-level wages and changes in industrial composition. Our finding is that the … very substantial and persistent. Our point estimates indicate that the total effect on average wages of a change in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465649

CEO Compensation and Cash-Flow Shocks : Evidence from Changes in Environmental Regulations

Choi, Seungho; Levine, Ross; Park, Jonghyeon; Xu, Simon - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024

This paper investigates how shocks to expected cash flows influence CEO incentive compensation. Exploiting changes in compliance with environmental regulations as shocks to expected future cash flows, we find that adverse shocks typically prompt corporate boards to recalibrate CEO compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486193

The Taxation of Executive Compensation

Hall, Brian J. - 2000

Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation paid through stock options. In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471173

Executive Compensation : Six Questions that Need Answering

Abowd, John M. - 1999

In this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471670

Compensation and Firm Performance

Ehrenberg, Ronald G. - 1987

This paper uses stochastic simulation and my U.S. econometric model to examine the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments. Are the variances, covariances, and parameters in the model such as to favor one instrument over the other, in particular the interest rate over the money supply? The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476924

Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Eaton, Jonathan - 1981

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478336

CEO Compensation

Frydman, Carola - 2010

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462072

Yesterday's Heroes : Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking

Cheng, Ing-Haw - 2010

We study the relationship between compensation and risk-taking among finance firms using a neglected insight from principal-agent contracting with hidden action and risk-averse agents. If the sensitivity of pay to stock price or slope does not vary with stock price volatility, then total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462481

Executive Compensation : Facts

Clementi, Gian Luca - 2009

In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463223

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326