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Bulow, Jeremy - 2009

We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463882

On Inferring Demand for Health Care in the Presence of Anchoring, Acquiescence, and Selection Biases

Bhattacharya, Jay - 2008

In the contingent valuation literature, both anchoring and acquiescence biases pose problems when using an iterative bidding game to infer willingness to pay. Anchoring bias occurs when the willingness to pay estimate is sensitive to the initially presented starting value. Acquiescence bias...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464782

Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests

Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957

The Impact of Counterfeit Victims in the Victim Marketplace

Ban, Mingyuan; Qian, Yi; Gong, Qiang; Aquino, Karl - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2025

Just and efficient allocations of charity have attracted much academic and media attention. The sources of inefficiency and unjust are important to understand yet understudied. Our study aims to fill this void by directly modelling the victims' market in a collective reputation framework. By...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015194973

How Do Strategic Complementarity and Substitutability Shape Equilibrium Dynamics?

Beaudry, Paul; Galizia, Dana S.; Portier, Franck - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024

Macroeconomic dynamics are shaped by how individual incentives to spend and accumulate interact with the decisions of others. The goal of this paper is to identify--within a simple large-game-theoretic structure--which types of agent interactions favor which types of dynamic equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635624

Phoning Home : The Procurement of Telecommunications for Incarcerated Individuals in the United States

Marra, M. R.; Miller, Nathan H.; Sileo, Gretchen - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024

Incarcerated individuals in the U.S. purchase goods and services from monopoly vendors selected by their correctional authority. We study telecommunications, which have come under bipartisan scrutiny due to the high prices inmates pay for phone calls. Prospective providers are evaluated on their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015171694

Bidding With Securities : Auctions and Security Design

DeMarzo, Peter M. - 2004

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold. Such auctions are commonly used, both formally and informally. In formal auctions, the seller restricts bids to an ordered set, such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467796

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain : Theory and Empirical Evidence

Lange, Andreas - 2004

Auction theory is one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet whether and to … remains under researched. This study begins by developing theory to explore auctions with resale when private values are … uncertain. We put our theory to the test by examining both field data and experimental data from the lab. Our field data are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468054

Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

Haile, Philip A. - 2003

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse' arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468589

The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO

Bagwell, Kyle - 2003

A prominent problem with the WTO dispute settlement procedures is the practical difficulty faced by small and developing countries in finding the capacity to effectively retaliate against trading partners that are in violation of their WTO commitments. In light of this problem, Mexico has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468776