We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find almost no evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, and strong evidence that laws facilitating private enforcement through disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets

The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are...

We examine whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 increased the information content of corporate earnings disclosures. Prior research questions whether the Act improved disclosure quality but generally relies on long-window tests and yields mixed results. We focus on whether the Act...

Financial markets are increasingly integrated globally. We examine the extent to which firms from different countries rely on alternative sources of capital, the locations where they raise capital, and the factors that affect these choices. During the 1990-2001 period, firms raised about $25.9...

Governments tend to increase their borrowing at the same time, giving rise to a global fiscal cycle. This global fiscal cycle has a large component that is unexplained by global business cycle variables. We propose a novel explanation for the emergence of the global fiscal cycle: governments'...

Research has shown that the unilateral accumulation of international reserves by a country can improve its own macro-financial stability. However, we show that when many countries accumulate reserves, the induced general equilibrium effects weaken financial and macroeconomic stability,...

Equity market liberalizations are like IPOs, but they are IPOs of a country's stock market rather than of individual firms. Both are endogenous events whose benefits are limited by poor investor protection, agency costs, and information asymmetries. As for stock prices following an IPO, there...

We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (1968) crime and punishment' framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (1976). We examine the...

Over the past two decades, the U.S. stock market has been shrinking as the public firm model has begun to fall out of favor. We develop a political economy model of delistings to study the wider economic consequences of this trend. We show that the private and social incentives to delist firms...