, and market opportunities. This know-how can be reallocated across countries as managers acquire control of factors of … consequences of international mobility of managerial know-how. We use the model and aggregate data to infer the relative scarcity …

Managerial delegation is essential for firm growth. While firms in poor countries often shun outside managers and …

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …

Enterprises (SOEs) in India. The program gave managers (the board of directors) of profitable SOEs more autonomy over strategic … that a manager subsequently joins a board of a private firm is greater for managers of those SOEs which were granted … may occur partly through managers' career concerns …

Commercializing knowledge involves transfer from discovering scientists to those who will develop it commercially. New … opportunities if high. Hence new knowledge remains naturally excludable and appropriable. Team production allows more knowledge … capture of tacit, complex discoveries by firm scientists. A robust indicator of a firm's tacit knowledge capture (and strong …

technological information. FDI is an alternate, potentially equally important channel for the mediation of such knowledge spillovers …. I introduce a framework for measuring international knowledge spillovers at the firm level, and I use this framework to … directly test the hypothesis that FDI is a channel of knowledge spillovers for Japanese multinationals undertaking direct …

unique aspect of this survey is it collected management data from the CEO, a random sample of senior managers and workers. We … poorly managed firms. This distribution of management scores is similar for CEOs, senior managers and workers management, and …, we find that the CEO's management scores are the most predictive of firm performance, followed by the senior managers and …

shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and …