We study time-consistent bank resolution mechanisms. When interventions are ex post efficient, a government cannot commit not to inject capital into the banking system. Contrary to common wisdom, we show that the government may still avoid moral hazard and implement the first best allocation by...

We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirements on equilibrium bank risk taking, commercial bank failure, interest rates on loans, and market structure. We propose a market structure where big banks with market power interact with small,...

We investigate the relationships of bank failures and balance sheet conditions with measures of proximity to different forms of transportation in the United States over the period from 1830-1860. A series of hazard models and bank-level regressions indicate a systematic relationship between...

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations during the Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract...

Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. To illuminate the value of this ubiquitous institution, we examine a Progressive Era policy experiment in which hitherto independent regulators came under gubernatorial supervision. After this change, failure rates declined...

This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...

In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in...

Speculative runs on asset price fixing schemes are most often attributed either to an inexplicable mass hysteria or to a sudden, unpredictable random disturbance. Such attribution places runs and panics outside of the realm of scientific inquiry. Alternatively, in this paper I define the notion...

We explore the actions of financially distressed banks in two distinct periods that include financial crises (1985-1994, 2005-2014) and differ in bank regulations, especially concerning capital requirements and enforcement. In contrast to the widespread belief that distressed banks gamble for...

Giving the FDIC authority to wind up troubled banks before their tangible net worth is exhausted has reduced the role of government in the insolvency-resolution process. Consistent with an hypothesis that FDICIA has improved incentives, our data show that a markedly larger percentage of troubled...