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Institutional Drift, Property Rights, and Economic Development : Evidence from Historical Treaties

Feir, Donna; Gillezeau, Rob; Jones, Maggie - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

For nearly three centuries, Indigenous peoples within the borders of present-day Canada engaged in treaty-making with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014372470

The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying : How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission

de Figueiredo, John M. - 2000

lobbying (internal organization vs. trade association) by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and … limitations of the collective action theories and transaction cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of … over 900 lobbying contacts cover 101 issues at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in early 1998. We find that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471024

Outside Options, Coercion, and Wages : Removing the Sugar Coating

Dippel, Christian - 2015

In economies with a large informal sector firms can increase profits by reducing workers' outside options in that informal sector. We formalize this idea in a simple model of an agricultural economy with plantation owners who lobby the government to enact coercive policies--e.g. the eviction and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457708

Heterogeneous Returns to Active Labour Market Programs for Indigenous Populations

Feir, Donna; Foley, Kelly; Jones, Maggie - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

Canada using administrative data on the universe of participants in the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334377

Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance

Alesina, Alberto - 2004

We survey and assess the literature on the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes. Our focus is on both focus both cities in developed countries (the US) and villages in developing countries. We also consider the endogenous formation of political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468381

Factions in Nondemocracies : Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party

Francois, Patrick - 2016

This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the factional arrangements and dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Our empirical analysis ranges from the end of the Deng Xiaoping era to the current Xi Jinping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455905

The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements

Bouton, Laurent - 2016

This paper presents a dynamic political-economic model of total government obligations. Its focus is on the interplay between debt and entitlements. In our model, both are tools by which temporarily powerful groups can extract resources from groups that will be powerful in the future: debt...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456109

Collective Action in an Asymmetric World

Chen, Cuicui - 2016

A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456435

Homophily and Transitivity in Dynamic Network Formation

Graham, Bryan S. - 2016

In social and economic networks linked agents often share additional links in common. There are two competing explanations for this phenomenon. First, agents may have a structural taste for transitive links -- the returns to linking may be higher if two agents share links in common. Second,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456489

Redistribution and Group Participation : Comparative Experimental Evidence from Africa and the UK

Fafchamps, Marcel - 2015

We design an original laboratory experiment to investigate whether redistributive actions hinder the formation of Pareto-improving groups. We test, in an anonymous setting with no feedback, whether people choose to destroy or steal the endowment of others and whether they choose to give to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457539