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Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation : The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile

MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2016

a way to integrate Williamson's (1975) notion of guile into agency theory. We find that designing sales contracts for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456519

Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets

Golosov, Mikhail - 2016

-- the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive formulations allow to reduce often complex models to a sequence of …-contained treatment of the basic theory: the Revelation Principle, formulating and simplifying the incentive constraints, using promised … advanced topics: duality theory and Lagrange multiplier techniques, models with lack of commitment, and martingale methods in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456661

Nudges in Exercise Commitment Contracts : A Randomized Trial

Bhattacharya, Jay - 2015

Our empirical analysis shows that people who are interested in exercise commitment contracts choose longer contracts when nudged to do so, and are then more likely to meet their pre-stated exercise goals. People are also more likely to enroll in a subsequent commitment contract after the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457262

Rigidity of Public Contracts

Moszoro, Marian - 2015

We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with relational private contracts. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based rigid clauses;...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457481

Executive Compensation : A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457535

Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts

Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija - 2015

Parties often regulate their relationships through "continuing" contracts that are neither long-term nor short-term but usually roll over. We study the trade-off between long-term, short-term, and continuing contracts in a two period model where gains from trade exist in the first period, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457663

The Value of Informativeness for Contracting

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2014

The informativeness principle demonstrates qualitative benefits to increasing signal precision. However, it is difficult to quantify these benefits -- and compare them against the costs of precision -- since we typically cannot solve for the optimal contract and analyze how it changes with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458123

Optimal Employment Contracts with Hidden Search

Lentz, Rasmus - 2014

In this paper I explore optimal employment contract design in a random search framework, where workers search on and off the job for employment opportunities similar to that of Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2013). The worker determines the frequency by which employment opportunities arrive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458676

Procyclical Leverage and Value-at-Risk

Adrian, Tobias - 2013

distribution given by Extreme Value Theory (EVT), intermediaries maintain a constant probability of default to shifts in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459718

Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts

Moszoro, Marian W. - 2012

The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460024