This paper summarizes recent research by the authors on the effects of free trade areas (FTAs). Within our model, which emphasizes inter-continental transport costs, several conclusions arise. (1) FTAs are likely to be detrimental over a moderate range of parameter values, even if drawn along...

A free trade agreement supports global free trade since trade barriers tend to divert trade in favor of members, but not reduce imports. The term: 'mutual assured deterrence' is used to refer to a regional free trade association that has the feature that no member can gain individually from the...

Models having multivariate probit and related structures arise often in applied health economics. When the outcome dimensions of such models are large, however, estimation can be challenging owing to numerical computation constraints and/or speed. This paper suggests the utility of estimating...

This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design of health insurance policies. Such policies must make tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard (the incentive of people to seek more...

This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity constrained equilibria in which some agents whose length of lifetime is uncertain find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on...

This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on...

Do new migration opportunities for rural households change the nature and extent of informal risk sharing? We experimentally document that randomly offering poor rural households subsidies to migrate leads to a 40% improvement in risk sharing in their villages. We explain this finding using a...

We study repurchase options (repo contracts) in a competitive asset market with asymmetric information. Gains from trade emerge from a liquidity need, but private information about asset quality prevents the full realization of trade. We obtain a unique equilibrium, which features a pooling repo...

We study insurance markets with nonexclusive contracts, introducing bilateral endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under remarkably mild conditions, and characterize the unique equilibrium...

Privately-produced safe debt is designed so that there is no adverse selection in trade. This is because no agent finds it profitable to produce private information about the debt's backing and all agents know this (i.e., it is information-insensitive). But in some macro states, it becomes...