This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …

of the world, individuals acquire skill; however outside investors and individuals inefficiently share risk. We show that … economy enters an endogenous disaster state. We show that the possibility of these disaster states distorts risk prices, even …

provision of marginal incentives, and applies the theory to explain variation in the form of compensation of over-the-road truck … of hauls in a way that is consistent with the theory. By contrast, we find that vehicle ownership, which defines a driver …

substantially increasing the risk borne by contractors …

A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - - tax … preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - - on ex ante incentives and risk …

Insurance induces a well-known tradeoff between the welfare gains from risk protection and the welfare losses from … the tradeoff simultaneously, allowing for a relationship between moral hazard and risk protection. An important feature of …, and stoplosses that alter moral hazard as well as risk protection relative to no insurance. I illustrate the properties of …

which reduced takeover fears allow CEO's to skim more. We compute lower bounds on the relative risk aversion coefficients …

Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had …