We present 12 facts about the mortgage crisis. We argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from finance industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, we argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and...

Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers originated about 65% of all subprime mortgages. Yet little is known about their behavior during the runup to the crisis. Using data from New Century Financial Corporation, we find that brokers earned an average revenue of $5,300 per funded loan. We...

This paper discusses four bankruptcy-related policy issues. First, what is the economic rationale for having a bankruptcy procedure at all and what defines an economically efficient bankruptcy procedure? Second, why did the number of U.S. bankruptcy filings increase so dramatically between 1980...

Illiquidity in short-term credit markets during the financial crisis might have severely curtailed the supply of non-bank consumer credit. Using a new data set linking every car sold in the United States to the credit supplier involved in each transaction, we find that the collapse of the...

Commentaries on the credit bubble of 2003-2007 routinely equate it with earlier episodes like the Internet boom. While credits were over-priced like Internet stocks a decade before, we show, using a model based on disagreement and short-sales constraints, that this is where the similarity ends....

Price-based liquidity metrics are better in 2013-2014 for small trades and large high-yield bond trades, but not for large investment grade bond trades, relative to before the crisis, and are better for all bond types and trade sizes relative to 2010-2012. This evidence contrasts with the...

We present evidence of a particular type of loan steering in which lenders lead borrowers to take out high margin mortgage products. We identify this activity by comparing borrowers who were rejected by lenders but were subsequently approved by their affiliates (steered borrowers) to other...

We develop a new model of the mortgage market where both borrowers and lenders can default. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. The government plays a crucial role by providing both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance....

We examine the relationship between concentration and price dispersion using variation induced by a merger in the Canadian mortgage market. Since interest rates are determined through a search and negotiation process, consolidation eliminates a potential negotiation part- ner, weakening...

We produce first results on the sustainability of homeownership for recent (2007-2009) FHA-insured borrowers. More than 15 percent of these borrowers have already been 90 days or more delinquent, while less than 7 percent have completed their graduation to sustainable homeownership by finally...