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We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528381
optimal bailout policy in the presence of this "doom loop". Rescuing banks with high domestic sovereign exposure is optimal if … these banks are sufficiently central in the network, even though that requires larger bailout expenditures than rescuing low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481658
We study optimal bailout policies in the presence of banking and sovereign crises. First, we use European data to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482628
We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460074
This paper studies debt fragility and the sharing of the resulting strategic uncertainty through ex post bailouts. Default arises in equilibrium because of both fundamental shocks and beliefs. The probability of default depends on borrowing rates and, in equilibrium, on the beliefs of lenders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460282
Time-inconsistency of no-bailout policies can create incentives for banks to take excessive risks and generate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459895
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they are uncertain about when they will want to eliminate their holding of a financial asset. Borrowers are concerned about liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to continue to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471328
In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462291
This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464752
Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in state bank supervision and regulation contribute toward explaining the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S. counties during the Great Depression. More stringent capital requirements lowered suspension...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468218