We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks' incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency...

Inspired by the Silicon Valley Bank run and building on Diamond- Dybvig (1993), we develop a model in which asset price fluctuations can trigger bank runs. Liquidation amounts to selling assets at their market price. Depositors can buy and hold the assets after paying an idiosyncratic cost. We...

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations during the Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract...

Financial repression can be used to avoid a government default when fiscal policy is constrained. We present a model showing that optimal financial repression progresses through successive stages with increasing levels of distortion. Data from advanced economies suggest that the initial stage of...

In the face of rising interest rates in 2022, banks mitigated interest rate exposure of the accounting value of their assets but left the vast majority of their long-duration assets exposed to interest rate risk. Data from call reports and SEC filings shows that only 6% of U.S. banking assets...

Bank payout policy is strongly affected by regulation and politics, especially for the largest banks. Banks, but not industrial firms, have consistently lower payouts in times of high regulation uncertainty and under democratic presidents. After the Global Financial Crisis, bank regulators'...

We assess the efficacy of systemic risk measures that rely on U.S. financial firms' stock return co-movements with market- or sector-wide returns under stress from 1927 to 2023. We ascertain stress episodes based on widening of corporate bond spreads and narrative dating. Systemic risk measures...

While reliance on human discretion is a pervasive feature of institutional design, human discretion can also introduce costly noise (Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein 2021). We evaluate the consequences, determinants, and trade-offs associated with discretion in high-stake decisions assessing bank...

A large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for regulating banks to increase financial stability. This literature abstracts from the discretion that accounting standards give banks over financial reporting, creating a gap between the information assumed...

This study analyzes information production and trading behavior of banks with lending relationships. We combine trade-by-trade supervisory data and credit-registry data to examine banks' proprietary trading in borrower stocks around a large number of corporate events. We find that relationship...