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A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, Jerry R. - 1982
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478271
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Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives : Evidence from a Tournament
Freeman, Richard B. - 2006
This paper examines performance in a tournament setting with different levels of inequality in rewards and different provision of information about individual's skill at the task prior to the tournament. We find that that total tournament output depends on inequality according to an inverse U...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466074
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On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments : Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments
List, John - 2014
Both private and public organizations constantly grapple with incentive schemes to induce maximum effort from agents. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory reveals a critical link between the distribution of luck and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458656
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Non-linear Incentives and Worker Productivity and Earnings : Evidence from a Quasi-experiment
Freeman, Richard B. - 2019
reach targets in sales, production, or cost reduction. Using administrative data from a major Chinese insurance firm that … raised its sales targets and rewards for insurance agents greatly in 2015, we find that increased incentives induced agents … to increase sales of the increasingly incentivized life insurance products, bunched around the new targets, albeit in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479463
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Misconduct in Credence Good Markets
Brown, Jennifer - 2012
of the model using sales complaint data for exclusive and independent insurance agents. We find that exclusive insurance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460054
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The Role of Agents and Brokers in the Market for Health Insurance
Karaca-Mandic, Pinar - 2013
Health insurance markets in the United States are characterized by imperfect information, complex products, and … substantial search frictions. Insurance agents and brokers play a significant role in helping employers navigate these problems … insurance. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the influence of agents/brokers on health insurance decisions of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459319
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The Heterogeneous Effect of Affirmative Action on Performance
Bracha, Anat - 2018
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of gender-based affirmative action (AA) on performance in the lab, focusing on a tournament environment. The tournament is based on GRE math questions commonly used in graduate school admission, and at which women are known to perform worse on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480973
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Confidence Management in Tournaments
Deng, Shanglyu - 2020
An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire's type differs from the true underlying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481769
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Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments
Brown, Jennifer - 2011
We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect--the stronger the expected future competitor, the lower the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461018
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Pay for Percentile
Barlevy, Gadi - 2011
We analyze an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461463