Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions …. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts …

. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of … the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the … explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find …

's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin, of $0.10 in income for each $1.00 reduction in …We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may … induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set out a …

assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within …In this paper I summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations …

incentive schemes by varying the responsiveness of the penalty to the intensity of default, without changing the total cost … applied in case of a complete default. At the limit our incentive scheme converges to an exogenous default cost regime. We … dependency of the supply curve on the incentive scheme. A rise in the elasticity of the penalty with respect to the default …

"--prepaid then clawed back if targets are unmet. We theoretically document that loss framing raises incentives for costly risk … evidence of these concerns in a nationwide field experiment among 294 car dealers. Dealers randomized into loss-framed (but …

success in the tournament. Finally, we find that cheating/fudging on the experiment responds to the level of inequality and …

closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives …This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in … utility, a pecuniary cost of effort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract's functional form is independent of the …

-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied …. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information before the Agent responds with her information. Under such … a contract, the Agent's compensation varies only with the Principal's information, while her information is used to …