We analyze theoretically an institution called a "limited-tenure concession" for its ability to induce efficient public goods contribution and common-pool resource extraction. The basic idea is that by limiting the tenure over which an agent can enjoy the public good, but offering the...

Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the dynamic vitality' of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s...

Existing models of open-access resources are applicable to non-storable resources, such as fish. Many open-access resources, however, are used to produce storable goods. Elephants, rhinos, and tigers are three prominent examples. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase...

Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. But in practice the security of these property rights varies substantially owing to differences in design. In fisheries, the design of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) varies widely; the consequences of...

Social capital can facilitate community governance, but not all social capital is alike. We distinguish bonding social capital (within a village) from bridging social capital (between villages), and we compare their effects on the management of a common pool resource. We develop a theoretical...

We consider trade between a consumer' country with an open access renewable resource and a conservationist' country that regulates resource harvesting to maximize domestic steady-state utility. In what we call the mild overuse' case, the consumer country exports the resource good and suffers...