. Consistent with firms seeking to avoid costly regulation, we document significant bunching around multiple regulatory thresholds …

-driven regulation based on "safe tests," i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed …

We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable … and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other socially desirable activity. When … risk, this type of regulation can raise welfare …

basic and ubiquitous features of regulation as actually implemented throughout the world has received little theoretical … because exemption induces additional harmful activity to be channeled their way. This article analyzes optimal regulation with … each cause harm although at different levels, and the regulatory regime affects entry as well as the output choices of …

disclosure requirements that exist in these markets. We show that reducing the number of charlatans through regulation decreases … regulation, implying that the regulation we observe in these markets likely derives from producer interests. Using these insights …

country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry …, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value added per employee in naturally "high entry …" industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no …

We study the entry and exit of firms across U.S. industries over the past 40 years. The elasticity of entry with … models suggest two potential explanations: rising entry costs or rising returns to scale. We find that neither returns to … scale nor technological costs can explain the decline in the Q- elasticity of entry, but lobbying and regulations can. We …