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Glaeser, Edward L. - 2002

Many factors including incentive-pay, powerful shareholders, and takeover threats push for-profits managers towards maximizing shareholder value. One of the most striking factors about non-profit firms is that they have no comparable governance institutions, and the only check on managers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469793

Hall of Mirrors : Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy

Bertrand, Marianne - 2018

Politicians and regulators rely on feedback from the public when setting policies. For-profit corporations and non-pro t entities are active in this process and are arguably expected to provide independent viewpoints. Policymakers (and the public at large), however, may be unaware of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480980

Improving Public Sector Management at Scale? Experimental Evidence on School Governance India

Muralidharan, Karthik - 2020

We present results from a large-scale experimental evaluation of an ambitious attempt to improve management quality in Indian schools (implemented in 1,774 randomly-selected schools). The intervention featured several global "best practices" including comprehensive assessments, detailed school...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482348

Does Management Matter in Schools

Bloom, Nicholas - 2014

We collect data on operations, targets and human resources management practices in over 1,800 schools educating 15-year-olds in eight countries. Overall, we show that higher management quality is strongly associated with better educational outcomes. The UK, Sweden, Canada and the US obtain the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457998

Cronyism and Capital Controls : Evidence from Malaysia

Johnson, Simon - 2001

The initial impact of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically favored firms. Of the estimated $60 billion loss in market value for politically connected firms from July 1997 to August 1998, roughly 9% can be attributed to the fall...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470197

The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World

Engerman, Stanley L. - 2001

Most analysis of how the distribution of political power affects the patterns of growth has been confined to the late-twentieth century. One problem associated with a focus on the modern record is that processes that take place over the long run are not examined. We may all agree that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470206

The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying : How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission

de Figueiredo, John M. - 2000

lobbying (internal organization vs. trade association) by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and … limitations of the collective action theories and transaction cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of … over 900 lobbying contacts cover 101 issues at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in early 1998. We find that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471024

The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites : Policy Goals and Interest Group Influence

Sigman, Hilary - 2000

Bureaucracies may set priorities for their workload according to social goals or the desires of concentrated private interests. This paper explores bureaucratic priorities empirically by studying Superfund, the federal program for cleaning up contaminated sites. It examines the amount of time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471057

Obstacles to Optimal Policy : The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms

Kroszner, Randall S. - 2000

This paper provides a positive political economy analysis of the most important revision of the U.S. supervision and regulation system during the last two decades, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). We analyze the impact of private interest groups as well as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471187

Elected versus Appointed Regulators : Theory and Evidence

Coate, Stephen - 2000

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471190

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