We construct a perpetual youth DSGE model with aggregate un- certainty in which there are dynamically complete markets and agents have Epstein-Zin preferences. We prove that, when endowments have a realistic hump-shaped age-profile, our model has three steady-state equilibria. One of these...

We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of...

We test whether the impact of financial constraints on firm value is observable in asset" returns. We form portfolios of firms based on observable characteristics related to financial" constraints, and test for common covariation in the stock returns of these firms. Using several" different...

A firm is subject to `economic exposure' if changes in exchange rates affect the firm's value, as measured by the present value of its future cash flows. This paper shows that in many forms of competition, including the most commonly studied case of monopoly, the economic exposure of an...

This paper develops a framework for analyzing transactions that transfer a company's controlling block from an existing controller to a new controller. This framework is used to compare the market rule, which is followed in the United States, with the equal opportunity rule, which prevails in...

This paper compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. These forecasts are provided by management to investors and shareholders in 51 HLTs completed between 1983 and 1989. Our estimates of discounted cash...

The paper studies under what conditions the value of the firm occasionally increases for a while before it suddenly drops, like a "bubble". We consider the environment where the trend of net cash flow from a firm's production depends on uncertain quality of a manager, and the manager is...