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Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited
Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
's size n? We model it as an optimal honest and obedient communication mechanism and we show that for large n it can be … implemented with a very simple mechanism that we call the Voluntary Based Organization. Two new results emerge from this analysis … mechanism is the same as in an unorganized group, a result that is not generally true if obedience is omitted. An optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188
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Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests
Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957
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Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection : Evidence from the Field
Del Carpio, Lucía; Kapon, Samuel; Chassang, Sylvain - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
In the context of collecting property taxes from 13432 households in a district of Lima (Peru), we investigate whether prioritized enforcement can improve the effective use of limited enforcement capacity. We randomly assign households to two treatment arms: one replicating the city's usual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334436
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Content Moderation with Opaque Policies
Kominers, Scott Duke; Shapiro, Jesse M. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
A sender sends a signal about a state to a receiver who takes an action that determines a payoff. A moderator can block some or all of the sender's signal before it reaches the receiver. When the moderator's policy is transparent to the receiver, the moderator can improve the payoff by blocking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486247
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Moral Hazard and Unemployment in Competitive Equilibrium
Rey, Patrick; Stiglitz, Joseph E. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given. We construct a general equilibrium model where workers' reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635663
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Screening Adaptive Cartels
Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334437
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Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Edmans, Alex - 2009
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
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A Delegation Approach to Regulating Hiring Discrimination
Martellini, Paolo; Menzio, Guido - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
-revelation mechanism without transfers) in order to reduce the impact of the firm's bias on its hiring behavior. The hiring regulation is … firm. We characterize the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468218
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Information Flows, Organizational Structure, and Corporate Governance
Malenko, Nadya - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
This survey provides an overview of theoretical and empirical research on information flows in corporations. It highlights key frictions preventing effective information flows and discusses how organizational structure and corporate governance can alleviate these frictions, focusing on three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014287310
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Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers
Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
Collective action is a dynamic process where individuals in a group assess over time the benefits and costs of participating toward the success of a collective goal. Early participation improves the expectation of success and thus stimulates the subsequent participation of other individuals who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014544751