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The Governance of Not-For-Profit Firms
Glaeser, Edward L. - 2002
maximizing shareholder value. One of the most striking factors about non-profit firms is that they have no comparable governance … essay discusses the implications of these weak governance institutions on non-profit behavior. A primary implication is that … is the need of the organizations to compete in outside markets. After presenting a model of non-profit behavior, I look …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469793
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Improving Public Sector Management at Scale? Experimental Evidence on School Governance India
Muralidharan, Karthik - 2020
, change accountability or incentives. We find that the assessments were near-universally completed, and that the ratings were …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482348
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Does Management Matter in Schools
Bloom, Nicholas - 2014
We collect data on operations, targets and human resources management practices in over 1,800 schools educating 15-year-olds in eight countries. Overall, we show that higher management quality is strongly associated with better educational outcomes. The UK, Sweden, Canada and the US obtain the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457998
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The Tenuous Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives
Prendergast, Canice - 2000
Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had much success. Indeed, the data seem to suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives, rather than the posited negative tradeoff. I argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470935
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Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2000
The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to themselves through a variety of mechanisms, such as self-dealing, insider trading, and taking of corporate opportunities. A common view in the law and economics literature is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
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Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do
Bertrand, Marianne - 2000
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471166
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The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency
Goldman, Eitan - 2000
When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are allocated by managerial authority within the firm. We explore this choice of organizational form using a model of price formation in which agents negotiate prices on behalf of their principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471182
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Does Product Market Competition Reduce Agency Costs?
Jagannathan, Ravi - 2000
The folk wisdom is that competition reduces agency costs. We provide indirect empirical support for this view. We argue that the temptation to retain cash and engage in less productive activities is more severe for firms in less competitive industries. Hence an unanticipated increase in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471296
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Empire-Builders and Shirkers : Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
Do firms systematically over- or underinvest as a result of agency problems? We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they have private benefits and underinvest when they have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471449
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Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
Empirical research on executive compensation has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution of incentives and responsibilities for other members of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450