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Institutional Drift, Property Rights, and Economic Development : Evidence from Historical Treaties

Feir, Donna; Gillezeau, Rob; Jones, Maggie - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

For nearly three centuries, Indigenous peoples within the borders of present-day Canada engaged in treaty-making with the British Crown and other European powers. These treaties regularly formed the colonial legal basis for access to Indigenous lands. However, treaties were not negotiated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014372470

Courts and Relational Contracts

Johnson, Simon - 2001

contracts. Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positive effect on the level of trust shown in new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470146

Incentives in HMOs

Gaynor, Martin - 2001

theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do in fact induce physicians to deviate from a … details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firm's internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470196

Financial Contracting

Hart, Oliver - 2001

structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470439

How Wide is the Scope of Hold-Up-Based Theories? Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking

Hubbard, Thomas N. - 1999

form for short hauls -- hauls for which quasi-rents are particularly small. Contracts' role as protectors of quasi …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471437

The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements : Theory and Evidence

Libecap, Gary D. - 1999

This paper extends the existing theory and empirical investigation of unitization contracts. It highlights the …-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that are the same as their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471652

Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems

Edlin, Aaron S. - 1997

an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well … renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472728

The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders

Wilson, Berry K. - 1996

imposition of state or federal restrictions on the contracts they write with bank creditors. We contrast stockholders that were …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472980

Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment

Edlin, Aaron S. - 1995

parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after uncertainty about the … desirability of trade is resolved. We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when either a breach …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473886

Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments : Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages

Edlin, Aaron S. - 1994

contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] when …-front payments with what we call 'Cadillac' contracts (contracts for a very high quality or quantity). This combination provides …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473989