We investigate how criminal organizations strategically use violence to influence elections in order to get captured politicians elected. The model offers novel testable implications about the use of pre-electoral violence under different types of electoral systems and different degrees of...

The central objective of this paper is to show how vertical restraints, which affect intra-brand competition, can and will be used as an effective mechanism for reducing inter-brand competition and increasing producer profits. We show how exclusive territories alter the perceived demand curve,...

This paper focuses on two separate problems. The first is that frequently, the most profitable use of funds involves long-term investments, which militiates for long-term debt contracts. The second problem is to monitor the investor's use of funds, as exemplified by the U.S. S&L saga, and we...

This paper examines the rationale for vertical restraints. It shows that there are important circumstances under which these restrictions have significant anti-competitive effects. The paper focuses on the consequences of exclusive territorial arrangements among the retailers of two products...

Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given. We construct a general equilibrium model where workers' reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously...