This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the … contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the …

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks …

Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough … into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time … investments during their last years in office. In our empirical work, however, we find that investment expenditures on research …

This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the … current investment opportunities. An interquartile increase is associated with a decline of 0.11% in the growth of R&D (scaled …

shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … investment are increasing in managerial incentives. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment …

large Indian garment firm with rich survey data on line managers, we find that several key dimensions of managerial quality …