Showing 1 - 10 of 1,261
three non-exclusive explanations for what drives executive pay -- shareholder value maximization by boards, rent extraction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
An effective performance-based compensation system must increase the probability of high performance corporate outcomes in order to justify the incremental expense relative to a straight salary system. A positive relation between current performance and current compensation indicates that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475894
We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466561
What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471944
Would moving to relative performance contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance? To address this we exploit the large rise in relative performance awards and the share of equity pay in the UK over the last two decades. Using new employer-employee matched datasets we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456270
governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do … incomes. With regard to performance, CEOs are paid for performance and penalized for poor performance. Finally, boards do … appears to be market determined and boards do appear to monitor their CEOs. Consistent with that, top executive pay policies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460264
This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the … contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the … intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to greater CEO diversion of assets as perquisites. We further show that boards …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453649
Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458857
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945