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Imperfect Information, Credit Markets and Unemployment

Greenwald, Bruce C. - 1986

This paper describes how imperfect information in both capital and labor markets can, in a context of maximizing firms and perfectly flexible prices and wages, give rise to cyclical variations in unemployment whose character closely resembles that of observed business cycles

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476976

Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks

Buchak, Greg - 2017

-16 basis points. We use a simple model to decompose the relative contribution of technology and regulation to the rise of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455393

What We Learn from China's Rising Shadow Banking : Exploring the Nexus of Monetary Tightening and Banks' Role in Entrusted Lending

Chen, Kaiji - 2016

We argue that China's rising shadow banking was inextricably linked to potential balance-sheet risks in the banking system. We substantiate this argument with three didactic findings: (1) commercial banks in general were prone to engage in channeling risky entrusted loans; (2) shadow banking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456782

Liquidity Regulation and Unintended Financial Transformation in China

Hachem, Kinda Cheryl - 2016

We trace the origins of China's rapidly developing shadow banking sector to the adoption of stricter liquidity rules by Chinese regulators in the late 2000s. Our analysis exploits cross-sectional di¤erences in the bindingness of these rules along with time variation in product characteristics....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456792

Sustainable Shadow Banking

Ordonez, Guillermo - 2013

Commercial banks are subject to regulation that restricts their investments. When banks are concerned for their … regulation has the potential to improve welfare. Still, reputation concerns depend on future economic prospects and may suddenly … a combination of traditional regulation and cross reputation subsidization may enhance shadow banking and make it more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459641

Trust and Social Collateral

Mobius, Markus - 2007

This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465528

What Explains House Price Booms? : History and Empirical Evidence

Bordo, Michael D. - 2013

In this paper we investigate the relationship between loose monetary policy, low inflation, and easy bank credit with house price booms. Using a panel of 11 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011 we estimate a panel VAR in order to identify shocks that can be interpreted as loose monetary policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459077

A Model of Shadow Banking

Gennaioli, Nicola - 2011

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461542

The Big Tech Lending Model

Liu, Lei; Lu, Guangli; Xiong, Wei - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

By comparing uncollateralized business loans made by a big tech lending program with conventional bank loans, we find that big tech loans tend to be smaller and have higher interest rates and that borrowers of big tech loans tend to repay far before maturity and borrow more frequently. These...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334379

The Value of Intermediaries for GSE Loans

Bosshardt, Joshua; Kakhbod, Ali; Kermani, Amir - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We analyze the costs and benefits of intermediaries for government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) mortgages using regulatory data. We find evidence of lenders pricing for observable and unobservable default risk independently from the GSEs. These findings are explained using a model of competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014337808

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