We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data … exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii …) lobbying status is highly persistent over time. Estimating a model of a firm's decision to engage in lobbying, we find …

firms are more likely to anger consumers. Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even if there are no … changes in prices). We illustrate these gains in a monopoly setting, where regulation affects welfare through 3 channels (i) a …); (ii) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the profits of an "unkind" firm increases total …

scale nor technological costs can explain the decline in the Q- elasticity of entry, but lobbying and regulations can. We … relative to large ones, particularly in industries with high lobbying expenditures. We conclude that lobbying and regulations …

for the costs of political bargaining and lobbying that arise from implementing and administering government regulation …. Regulation, tax, and Coasean exchange, such as through cap-and-trade regimes, are presented as substitutes, based on the relative …