Similar Search Results

Public Contracting for Private Innovation : Government Expertise, Decision Rights, and Performance Outcomes

Bruce, Joshua R. - 2018

We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012452996

Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing : a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

Chassang, Sylvain - 2014

possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458351

Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk

Philippon, Thomas - 2007

We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465063

Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk : Evidence from Procurement

Lewis, Gregory - 2011

Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461011

Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption : A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device

Tella, Rafael Di - 2007

There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered investigating levels of consumption that appear … the principal. We argue that this assumption has to be revised in applications that study corruption. The informativeness … consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications. We show that when there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465490

Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias : An Empirical Investigation

Anderson, James E. - 1999

Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce trade. This paper estimates the reduction, using a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471800

Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems

Edlin, Aaron S. - 1997

This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472728

Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Baker, George - 1993

Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474466

The Generalized Informativeness Principle

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2014

This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457937

Composition of Capital Flows : A Survey

Kirabaeva, Koralai - 2010

We survey several mechanisms that explain the composition of international capital flows: foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment and debt flows (bank loans and bonds). We focus on information frictions such as adverse selection and moral hazard, and exposure to liquidity shocks,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462165

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last