Showing 1 - 10 of 300
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004359318
This paper analyzes why the primary goal of the equity-pay explosion--creating long-run ownership incentives for top executives--has often been difficult to achieve in practice. More generally, I describe six challenges in the design of equity-based pay plans and discuss potential solutions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468810
that we believe explains the over-use of options and several apparent puzzles: boards and managers falsely perceive stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468914
The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456699
We show that CEOs strategically time corporate news releases to coincide with months in which their equity vests. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. CEOs reallocate news into vesting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458192
We investigate the importance of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, in executives' decisions about when to exercise stock options. We develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the more traditional measure of risk, equity volatility. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458689
This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager's short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459254
We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464501
We analyze and explore option fragility, the notion that option incentives are fragile due to their non-linear payoff structure. Option incentives become weaker as options fall underwater, leading to pressures to reprice options or restore incentives through additional grants of equity-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469654
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470054