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Game Modelling the Tokyo Round of Tariff Negotiations
Baldwin, Robert E. - 1985
Using actual trade and tariff data for the United States and the European Community, this paper demonstrates how a trade negotiation such as the Tokyo Round, can be modelled as a game among countries attempting to minimize individual welfare loss functions. Once welfare functions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477496
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Communication and Bargaining Breakdown : An Empirical Analysis
Backus, Matthew - 2020
Bargaining breakdown--whether as delay, conflict, or missing trade--plagues bargaining in environments with incomplete information. Can a bargaining environment that facilitates or restricts communication alleviate these costs? We exploit a unique opportunity to study this question using real...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482204
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Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework
Aizenman, Joshua - 1989
This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476029
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Sovereign-debt Renegotiations : A Strategic Analysis
Fernandez, Raquel - 1988
The process of debt-rescheduling between a creditor and a sovereign (LDC) debtor is modeled as a noncooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The creditor's threat to impose default penalties is ignored here as inherently incredible; instead, the debtor's motivation for repayment is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476473
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Naked Exclusion : An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
Landeo, Claudia M. - 2008
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464530
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Intermediaries in Bargaining : Evidence from Business-to-Business Used-Car Inventory Negotiations
Larsen, Bradley J.; Lu, Hengheng; Zhang, Anthony Lee - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
We analyze data on tens of thousands of alternating-offer, business-to-business negotiations in the wholesale used … mediating the negotiations. We find that who intermediates the negotiation matters: high-performing mediators are 22.03% more … negotiations, overcoming some of the inefficiency inherent in incomplete-information settings …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616607
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Work Rules, Featherbedding, and Pareto-Optimal Union Management Bargaining
Johnson, George E. - 1986
the case of negotiations over work rules and wages than in both the cases of fully efficient bargaining and of bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477257
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Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents : An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration
Ashenfelter, Orley - 2005
In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New Jersey with data we have systematically collected over the 18-year life of the program. Covering the wages of police officers and firefighters, this system provides virtually a laboratory setting for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467496
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Negotiating Free Trade
Aghion, Philippe - 2004
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467968
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Government Gains from Self-Restraint : A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution
Drazen, Allan - 2004
We present a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike most existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government finds it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468318