Secured lenders have recently demanded a new condition in distressed debt restructurings: competing secured lenders must lose priority. We model the implications of this "creditor-on-creditor violence" trend. In our dynamic model, secured lenders enjoy higher priority in default. However,...

Secured debt--a debt contract that offers security to creditors in the form of collateralized assets--has been a cornerstone of credit markets in most societies since antiquity. The ability to seize and sell collateral reduces the creditor's expected losses when the debtor defaults on a promised...

We examine the desirability of granting "safe harbor" provisions to creditors of financial intermediaries in sale-and-repurchase (repo) contracts. Exemption from an automatic stay in bankruptcy enables financial intermediaries to raise greater liquidity and induces entry of intermediaries with...

In an RCT with US small businesses, we document that a large share of firms are not well-informed about bankruptcy. Many assume that bankruptcy necessarily entails the death of a business and do not know about Chapter 11 bankruptcy, where debts are renegotiated so that the business can continue...

Because corporate limited liability protects founder's personal assets, creditors often require founders of new, small and risky firms to contract around limited liability by pledging their personal assets as collateral for loans to their firms. This makes personal bankruptcy law (PBL) relevant...

We investigate how firms manage financial default risk (on debt) and operational default risk (on delivery obligations). Financially constrained firms reduce operational hedging through inventory and supply chain in favor of cash holdings. Our model predicts that firms' markup increases with...

Using local natural disasters as a quasi-experimental setting, we show that heightened distress risk in shocked firms drives both these firms and their unshocked competitors to cut profit margins by about 0.8 percentage points. These reductions stem from predatory pricing, inventory liquidation,...

We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when...

We examine the importance of corporate assets in supporting debt. Prior studies typically see only secured debt as asset backed, while the rest is deemed cash flow based. This implies only a small fraction of US debt is asset backed. Yet because corporations often resist offering security...

We study a bank run in India in which private bank branches experience sudden and considerable loss of deposits that seek safety in state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). We trace the consequences of this reallocation using granular data on bank-firm relationships and branch balance sheets. The...