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Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide

González, Tanja Artiga - 2013

unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than … managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms … engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459775

CEO Pay and the rise of Relative Performance Contracts : A Question of Governance?

Bell, Brian - 2016

Would moving to relative performance contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance? To address this we exploit the large rise in relative performance awards and the share of equity pay in the UK over the last two decades. Using new employer-employee matched datasets we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456270

Contractual Freedom and the Evolution of Corporate Control in Britain, 1862 to 1929

Guinnane, Timothy W. - 2014

British general incorporation law granted companies an extraordinary degree of contractual freedom to craft their own governance rules. It provided companies with a default set of articles of association, but incorporators were free to reject any part or all of the model and write their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458187

Continuing Dangers of Disinformation in Corporate Accounting Reports

Kane, Edward J. - 2003

Insiders can artificially deflect the market prices of financial instruments from their full-information or inside value' by issuing deceptive accounting reports. Incentive support for disinformational activity comes through forms of compensation that allow corporate insiders to profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469064

Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression

Lamoreaux, Naomi - 2004

Legal records indicate that conflicts of interest -- that is, situations in which officers and directors were in a position to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders -- were endemic to corporations in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century U.S. Yet investors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467787

Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge

Becker, Bo - 2012

We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460861

Corporate Governance Implications of the Growth in Indexing

Brav, Alon; Malenko, Nadya; Malenko, Andrey - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

Passively managed funds have grown to become some of the largest shareholders in publicly traded companies, but there is considerable debate about the effects of this growth on corporate governance. The goal of this paper is to review the literature on the governance implications of passive fund...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477210

Propping and Tunneling

Friedman, Eric; Johnson, Simon; Mitton, Todd - 2003

In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468748

The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation

Crocker, Keith J. - 2006

This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the … contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016

Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions : Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans

Bergstresser, Daniel - 2004

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter … earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on pension assets. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates … of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468150

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