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Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms

Gorton, Gary - 1996

investment, and for contesting corporate governance. In Germany, where the stock market has historically been small, banks hold … representatives on corporate boards. If a banking relationship is a substitute for the stock market, then interaction with a bank … monopolistic control over access to external capital markets, then bank interests may conflict with those of other equityholders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473409

Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany

Kaplan, Steven N. - 1993

performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year … -- implying that top executives in Germany have longer tenures than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan. Turnover of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474534

Class Struggle Inside the Firm : A Study of German Codetermination

Gorton, Gary - 2000

the unification of East Germany and West Germany, a shock that may have caused employees in the former West to resist …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470791

Governance and Bank Valuation

Caprio, Gerard - 2003

supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks … cash flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468536

Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression

Lamoreaux, Naomi - 2004

Legal records indicate that conflicts of interest -- that is, situations in which officers and directors were in a position to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders -- were endemic to corporations in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century U.S. Yet investors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467787

Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge

Becker, Bo - 2012

We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460861

Corporate Governance Implications of the Growth in Indexing

Brav, Alon; Malenko, Nadya; Malenko, Andrey - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

Passively managed funds have grown to become some of the largest shareholders in publicly traded companies, but there is considerable debate about the effects of this growth on corporate governance. The goal of this paper is to review the literature on the governance implications of passive fund...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477210

Propping and Tunneling

Friedman, Eric; Johnson, Simon; Mitton, Todd - 2003

In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468748

Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures, and Hostile Takeovers

Gorton, Gary - 1999

We determine firms' equity ownership structures and provide a theory of hostile takeovers by distinguishing the roles of two types of blockholders: rich investors and institutional investors. We also distinguish the roles of two types of stock markets: the block market and the market with small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471671

Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression

Holderness, Clifford G. - 1998

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472258

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