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Constitution or Conflict?
Grossman, Herschel I. - 2002
A self-enforcing constitution creates a political process that provides an alternative to civil conflict for resolving … possible to design such a self-enforcing constitution. The paper is also concerned with discovering generic features of a self …-enforcing constitution. The analysis yields the following theoretical propositions: If and only if (1) none of the parties to a dispute …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469982
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Constitutions, Politics and Economics : A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"
Acemoglu, Daron - 2005
In this essay I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467450
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The Guarantees of Freedom
Porta, Rafael La - 2002
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American freedom, which allow judges to restrain law-making powers of the sovereign through constitutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469956
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The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers : An Analysis of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and Constitutional Transformation of the Nation's Monetary System Emerged
Grubb, Farley - 2005
The monetary powers embedded in the U.S. Constitution were revolutionary and led to a watershed transformation in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466888
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Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption : American States and Constitutional Change
Wallis, John Joseph - 2004
During the 1840s, twelve American states adopted new constitutions. Eleven of the twelve states adopted new procedures for issuing government debt and for chartering corporations through general incorporation acts. These institutional innovations were American inventions, and today hard budget...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468242
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Consequences of Constitutions
Persson, Torsten - 2003
electoral rules and forms of government for fiscal policy and rent extraction, even when non-random constitution selection is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468524
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Constitutions and Order : A Theory and Evidence from Colombia and the United States
Fergusson, Leopoldo; Mejia, Javier; Robinson, James A.; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
We propose a framework to explain why some societies may end up with different constitutional solutions to the problem of maintaining order in the face of self-interested behavior. Though the salient intellectual tradition since Hobbes has focused on how institutional design is used to eradicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014322888
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Separation of Powers and the Budget Process
Grossman, Gene M. - 2006
We study budget formation in a model featuring separation of powers. In our model, the legislature designs a budget bill that can include a cap on total spending and earmarked allocations to designated public projects. Each project provides random benefits to one of many interest groups. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466333
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Judicial Lobbying : The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation
Iaryczower, Matias - 2005
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over … decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467366
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Hobbesian Wars and Separation of Powers
Li, Weijia; Roland, Gérard; Xie, Yang - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
This paper formalizes the principle that persecution power of government may generate violent contests over it. We show that this principle yields a large set of theoretical insights on different separation-of-powers institutions that can help to preempt such contests under different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226142