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. Investments in reliance will be socially suboptimal in the absence of any pre-contractual liability -- and will be socially … excessive under strict liability for all reliance expenditures. Given the results for these polar cases, we focus on exploring … how 'intermediate' liability rules could be best designed to induce efficient reliance decisions. One of our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470489
Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events (corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464689
liability provisions in controlling incentive conflict among large bank stakeholders. Federal deposit insurance restored …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472354
We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479406
We study repurchase options (repo contracts) in a competitive asset market with asymmetric information. Gains from trade emerge from a liquidity need, but private information about asset quality prevents the full realization of trade. We obtain a unique equilibrium, which features a pooling repo...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481280
But when the information structure itself is endogenous - firms and consumers decide what information about insurance purchases to reveal to whom - there always exists a Nash equilibrium. Strategies for firms consist of insurance contracts to offer and information-revelation strategies; for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455126
We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection. Principals (e.g. employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms. Agents (e.g. workers, or asset holders)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463733
In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464146
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk averse agent would like to borrow from a risk neutral lender to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464753
This paper studies a unique panel dataset of transactions with repeat customers of an insurer operating in a market in which insurers are not required by law or contract to share information about their customers' records. I use this dataset to test the asymmetric learning hypothesis that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464896