An important aspect of corporate governance is the assessment of managers. When managers vary in ability, determining …? This paper begins an exploration of that issue by considering the consequence of one such bias, the base-rate fallacy, for … due to the base-rate fallacy, they can also benefit from this bias …

"frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a … reporting errors. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs …

The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution … of incentives and responsibilities for other members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal … responsibility. The aggregate pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand …

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to … ownership overlap, including mergers in the asset management industry and the growth of indexing, could in fact diminish …