Many firms have introduced internet-based customer self-service applications, such as online payments or brokerage services. Despite high initial signup rates, not all customers actually shift their dealings online. We investigate whether the multi-stage nature of the adoption process (an...

The purpose of the current work is to investigate how country-level and region-specific characteristics influence the adoption of a major financial telecommunication innovation and standard (SWIFT) in the banking sector. Using annual data on the diffusion and usage intensity of SWIFT between...

We estimate a dynamic oligopoly entry game in the early U.S. local telephone market. We observe the identities of potential entrants into local markets and therefore the waiting time of each potential entrant before it commits actual entry. To capture the feature of the data, we allow firms to...

We study how net neutrality regulations affect high-bandwidth content providers investment incentives in quality of services (QoS). We find that the effects crucially depend on network capacity levels. With a limited network capacity, the prioritized delivery services are complements to content...

Following up on our initial comments at the Tunney Act proceeding of the proposed merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, we discuss DOJ's criticisms of these comments, explaining why these criticisms are baseless. Moreover, using evidence from the NY v. Deutsche Telecom trial, we provide new...

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a usergroup. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe...

Dominant digital platforms such as Google and Facebook collect personal information of users by default precipitating a market failure in the market for personal information. We establish the economic harms from the market failure. We discuss conditions for eliminating the market failure and...

This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces...

We consider a platform that collects data from users. Data has commercial benefit to the platform, personal benefit to the user, and public benefit to other users. We ask whether the platform, or users, should have the right to decide which data the platform commercializes. We find that when...