We construct a model for pricing sovereign debt that accounts for the risks of both default and restructuring, and allows for compensation for illiquidity. Using a new and relatively efficient method, we estimate the model using Russian dollar-denominated bonds. We consider the determinants of...

We present a model of asset valuation in which short-selling is achieved by searching for security lenders and by bargaining over the terms of the lending fee. If lendable securities are di cult to locate, then the price of the security is initially elevated, and expected to decline over time....

We study the impact on asset prices of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining in an economy in which agents can trade only when they find each other. Marketmakers' prices are higher and bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other more easily. Prices become Walrasian as...

We study how intermediation and asset prices in over-the-counter markets are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade with each other as well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic...

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under natural conditions, prices are lower and illiquidity discounts higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners...

We study how intermediation and asset prices are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly marketmakersamp;rsqou; bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors or...

We provide the impact on asset prices of trade by search and bargaining. Under natural conditions, prices are higher if investors can find each other more easily, if sellers have more bargaining power, or if the fraction of qualified owners is greater. If agents face risk limits, then higher...

We construct a model for pricing sovereign debt that accounts for the risks of both default and restructuring, and allows for compensation for illiquidity. Using a new and relatively efficient method, we estimate the model using Russian dollar-denominated bonds. We consider the determinants of...

We study the impact on asset prices of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining in an economy in which agents can trade only when they find each other. Marketmakers' prices are higher and bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other more easily. Prices become Walrasian as...

We construct a model for pricing sovereign debt that accounts for the risks of both default and restructuring, and allows for compensation for illiquidity. Using a new and relatively efficient method, we estimate the model using Russian dollar-denominated bonds. We consider the determinants of...