Pensions and deferred compensation represent substantial components of CEO incentives. We study stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies' initial reports of CEOs' inside debt positions following a 2007 SEC disclosure reform. We find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the...

We examine the relation between CEOs equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower's performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of financial distresswhile also...

We study real estate purchases by major company CEOs, compiling a database of theprincipal residences of nearly every top executive in the Standard amp; Poor s 500 index. When a CEO buys real estate, future company performance is inversely related to the CEO s liquidation of company shares and...

This paper analyzes stock option wards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests...

This paper evaluates recent proposals in the legal and finance literature for limiting the sizes of boards of directors. After controlling for firm size and industry membership, I find evidence of an inverse association between board sizes and firms market values in a sample of 792 large U.S....

This paper proposes and implements a new method for investigating whether CEOs influence the terms of their own compensation. I analyze the dates of 591 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies in 1992 and 1993, finding that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in...

This paper analyzes companies' disclosure of CEO stock option values in compliance with recent changes in the SEC s regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Results suggest that companies exploit the flexibility of the SEC s disclosure regulations to reduce the...

This paper proposes and implements a new method for investigating whether CEOs influence the terms of their own compensation. I analyze the dates of 619 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, finding that the timing of awards coincides with favorable...

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC s regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies...

We investigate whether convertibility provisions and restrictive covenants operate as substitute methods for reducing agency costs of debt. In a study of the 192 recent debt issues, we find that an issuer s investment opportunities are negatively related to the presence of covenants and...