Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on...

This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness,...

We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the "name" but not the "type" of the other...

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The...

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the...

Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and...

Brenner and Vriend (2006) argued (experimentally and theoretically) that one should not expect proposers in ultimatum games to learn to converge to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer, as finding the optimal offer is a hard learning problem for (boundedly-rational) proposers. In this...

Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...

This paper develops a semiotic-inferential model of verbal communication for incomplete information games: a language is seen as a set of conventional signs that point to types, and the credibility of a message depends on the strategic context. Formally, there is an encoding-decoding step where...

The use of coarse categories is prevalent in various situations and has been linked to biased economic outcomes, ranging from discrimination against minorities to empirical anomalies in financial markets. In this paper we study economic rationales for categorizing coarsely. We think of the way...