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Local electoral rewards from centralized social programs : are mayors getting the credit?

Rodríguez-Chamussy, Lourdes - 2015

This paper uses variation in the timing of the Mexican antipoverty program's introduction across municipalities to identify its impact on the share of votes for the local incumbent party. Evidence is found that voters reward the mayor's party for the central benefit to their constituencies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289331

United We Vote

Eguia, Jon X. - 2006

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and … the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine … whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312299

When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

Soubeyran, Raphäel - 2006

We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312370

Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - 2006

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312542

Political motivations and electoral competition : equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis; Saporiti, Alejandro; Vriend, … - 2013

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198494

Vote buying or campaign promises? : electoral strategies when party credibility is limited

Hanusch, Marek; Keefer, Philip; Vlaicu, Razvan - 2016

What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218

Incumbent advantage, voter information and vote buying

Cruz, Cesi; Keefer, Philip; Labonne, Julien - 2016

Results from a new experiment shed light on the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The treatment provided voters with information about a major spending program and the proposed allocations and promises of mayoral candidates just prior to municipal elections. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521266

Political motivations and electoral competition : equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis; Saporiti, Alejandro; Vriend, … - 2011

series of laboratory experiments, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009271606

Electoral turnout during states of emergency and effects on incumbent vote share

Frank, Marco; Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - 2020

turnout is robust and there is no relevant heterogeneity of the increase across municipalities. We argue that voting is an act …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242044

Dancing with the populist : new parties, electoral rules and Italian municipal elections

Bordignon, Massimo; Colussi, Tommaso - 2020

This paper develops a theoretical framework that makes predictions on (a) the conditions under which a populist party decides to run and the policy position it takes and (b) voters' response under different electoral systems. We test these predictions using data on Italian municipal elections...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297337