We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

from a strategic action from the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non …

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they fall back on … their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If … there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition …

. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a …

coalition models. …

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition … unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our … conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no …