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The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly

Martín-Herrán, Guiomar; Rubio, Santiago J. - 2016

This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator … find that the lack of commitment leads to lower taxation and abatement that yield larger emissions and, consequently, a … social welfare. Thus, our analysis indicates that the lack of commitment has a negative impact of welfare although this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586850

Barriers to entry and the self-regulating profession: Evidence from the market for Italian accountants

Bortolotti, Bernardo; Fiorentini, Gianluca - 1997

This paper provides a systematic study of the market for accountants in Italy during the period 1980-91. Firstly, it develops a comparison in the determinants of incomes of the two competing professions (Commercialisti and Ragionieri) focusing on entry as one of the main variables of interest to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608304

The regulation of professions in Italy

Brosio, Giorgio - 1997

The paper deals with the regulation of professions in Italy. It is a very traditional system of regulation based on inputs control. This regulation is clearly excessive for most of the professions. In fact, market failures - both in terms of information asymmetries and externalities - do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608310

Voluntary environmental agreements and competition policy: The case of Germany's private system for packaging waste recycling

Lehmann, Markus A. - 2000

The paper takes the viewpoint of the neoinstitutional theory of the firm to analyse Germany's voluntary Dual Management System for Packaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD); namely, its governance structure and its contractual relations with upstream and downstream firms. Two aspects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608641

Voluntary agreements and competition law

Vedder, Hans H. B. - 2000

Many voluntary agreements (VA's) fall under the European or Dutch cartel prohibition (Article 81 EC, Article 6 Mededingingswet). This paper starts with an abstract description of the relation between competition and environmental protection. Particular attention is paid to the role in this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608642

Municipal Waste Collection: Market Competition and the EU Policy

Reggiani, Carlo; Silvestri, Francesco - 2015

Two of the main pillars of the EU waste collection policy are the Proximity Principle and Self-Sufficiency Principle. According to those, waste should be disposed as close as possible to where it has been produced. The effect of such provision is to increase the market power of local disposers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451167

A signalling model of environmental overcompliance

Denicolò, Vincenzo - 2000

I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608640

Optimal leniency programs

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000

Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608606

Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616

The application of competition law and policy to environmental agreements in an oligopolistic market

Bailey, Patricia M. - 2000

An environmental agreement in an oligopolistic market may violate the competition rules, as described in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Ordinarily, some collusion among firms is necessary for an environmental agreement to be successful. This collusion may be acceptable when it relates to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608636