We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non …-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that … we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core …

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and –whenever this is possible– they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic or … pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to existing approaches …

agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a … paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such …

outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is always nonempty when the game has strategic …

'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …