over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty …, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The … core is empty. …

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. …

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non …-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that … we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core …

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …