We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …

agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a … paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such …

outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is always nonempty when the game has strategic …

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non …-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that … we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core …

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and –whenever this is possible– they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic or … pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to existing approaches …

over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty …, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The … core is empty. …