would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. …

models of coalition formation:• Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their … preference rankings until a majority coalition forms.• Build-Up (BU): Similar to FB, except that when nonmajority subcoalitions … convergence process.FB better reflects the unconstrained, or nonmyopic, possibilities of coalition formation, whereas BU …

We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms …

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a … solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple contract … choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989 …

domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we …