This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies...

Voluntary agreements in various forms are being increasingly regarded as an instrument to substitute or complement regulating and pricing instruments. As, from a theoretical point of view, this instrument has strong proponents and opponents, it is important to make a careful analysis of the...

We consider a partnership game with two roles in which a large population of firms interact to carry out, say, R&D joint ventures. The partners have to build a common-property asset through a sequence of costly investments. Firms have access to a monitoring technology whose cost depends on the...

An environmental agreement in an oligopolistic market may violate the competition rules, as described in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Ordinarily, some collusion among firms is necessary for an environmental agreement to be successful. This collusion may be acceptable when it relates to the...

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This...

This study is concerned with the factors that influence the cooperation among cluster-based firms. Theorists have consistently demonstrated the role and importance of economic externalities, such as knowledge spillovers, within industrial clusters. Less attention has been paid to the...