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Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game
Deissenberg, Christophe; Dawid, Herbert; Sevcik, Pavel - 2004
We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325007
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Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results
Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - 2003
In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325147
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Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players
Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - 2003
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325152
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The application of competition law and policy to environmental agreements in an oligopolistic market
Bailey, Patricia M. - 2000
An environmental agreement in an oligopolistic market may violate the competition rules, as described in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Ordinarily, some collusion among firms is necessary for an environmental agreement to be successful. This collusion may be acceptable when it relates to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608636
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Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players
Cartwright, Edward - 2004
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324955
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International competition rules: The existing framework
Mavroidis, Petros C. - 1999
that the existing multilateral framework (World Trade Organization, WTO) can aptly accomplish the task. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608533
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Models of individual behaviour and implications for environmental policy
van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M.; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada; … - 1998
behaviour, formulated in terms of maximisation of utility in general, or profits in particular. The standard theory of … environmental economics behavioural assumptions have been most significant for the development of economic valuation theory and … environmental policy theory. The focus here will be on environmental policy theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608445
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A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons
lasserre, Pierre; Soubeyran, Antoine - 2001
This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608842
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Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds
Jackson, Matthew O.; Golub, Benjamin - 2007
We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and naïvely update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors' opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of all agents in large societies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312406
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Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
Querou, Nicolas; Beal, Sylvain - 2006
We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312539